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What Shall Be Our Course?
By WM. HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.
President, Colorado Bar Association
Last month, I stated that I would report on the judiciary committee,
the legislature and the supreme court. I find, however, that the Editor
has obtained articles from Mr. Henry and Mr. Van Cise which cover
this situation so adequately that I need say nothing further.
I do wish to point-up the effect of what these men have said. More
than seventy per cent of all lawyers in the state approved the bar bill. It
died in committee. A great preponderance of all bar associations and
lawyers in the state approved the judiciary reform plan. A major part
of this program died in the House. Fifteen thousand dollars and four
years of hard and extensive work were destroyed in a few months time.
This result stresses the need for the bar association to make an un-
equivocal choice of its future course of action with respect to public
legislation. Even if every lawyer made the bar bills a personal matter
with him, fought for those bills with all his strength and all his mind, it
still would not be enough. These are bills which, for the most part, are
public bills, that is, they benefit the public infinitely more than they do the
lawyers. The public must be convinced that these bills are actually for
its good.
Opponents of good government try to kill effective legislation by at-
tempting to show the lawyers' stake in these bills. Our interest is actually
a concern about the proper functioning of our judicial system. On a purely
selfish basis, we should continue to have hearings in county, district and
supreme courts as we are now allowed because it means larger fees to
lawyers. On a purely selfish basis, we should not be interested in a judicial
council for that might result in reforms which would reduce the cost of
justice. On a purely selfish basis, what concern is it of individual lawyers
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whether judges are well or poorly paid, have retirement and pension funds?
Or why should we care if the public is not interested in adequate disciplinary
procedure, thorough canons of judicial and professional ethics?
The public nature of the bar bills is the very thing that defeated them.
While the great majority of lawyers backed the bills and assisted whenever
called upon, there was not enough drive from all lawyers in each locality
and a public appreciation of the value of these bills to enact this legislation.
Our experience should teach us that it is useless to expect that bar bills
having a great public interest will secure much consideration unless we
have a complete reorganization of our approach to public legislation.
Mr. Van Cise suggests a lobbyist. That is only part of the answer.
We need to make the public our active partner in this effort" for good
government. We need a good public relations expert who can start now
to sell the bar program to the people before the 1951 legislature meets.
Then when the legislature convenes, we need a full-time man on the job
to guide the bar program through the legislature in the interest of the public.
Unless we are willing to go the entire way-good public relations which
embodies public confidence, and a legislative consultant-we should be
content to putter around with minor amendments to the statutes, and not
waste our energies in programs in the public interest.
I firmly believe that it is to the lawyers' interest for the Colorado bar
to unite in a dynamic and aggressive bar association-one that demands
and commands public respect. It should be zealous in protecting the interest
of the public in making the process of obtaining justice quicker and cheaper.
It must be in a position to insist, effectively, that lawyers and judges adhere
to professional morality and act as a unit in matters concerning the courts
and its officers.
The choice is that of this association. It should be clear cut and
definite. There can be no touring down the middle of the road, for traffic
flows only on one side or the other.
Denver Bar Association Reduces Dues
Dues for the members of the Denver Bar Association for the fiscal
year beginning July 1, 1949 were reduced by action of the Board of Trustees
on May 2.
For members in practice three years or more, the dues were reduced
from $15 per year to $12.50 per year, and, for members in practice less
than three years, the reduction was from $7.50 to $6.00 per year.
This reduction was made possible by the fact that some of the projects
originally proposed and sponsored by the Denver Bar Association have been
taken over on a state-wide basis by the Colorado Bar Association, whose
dues for the next ensuing fiscal year are identical with those of the Denver
association. Dues include subscription costs for Dicta and the weekly
advance sheets of the Supreme Court opinions.
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Five New Real Estate Standards for Denver
Five additional real estate title standards have been promulgated for
the Denver Bar Association by its Real Estate Standards committee, Edwin
J. Wittelshofer, chairman, announced on May 20.
At the same time, these new title standards are being circulated among
the members of the state committee on Real Estate Standards with the
view to possible adoption by the Colorado Bar Association at its annual
convention next October.
The new Denver Bar Association standards are:
Standard No. 57-Deed by Administrator with Will Annexed
under power contained in will which is not a foreign will.
Problem: Is a title marketable when based on a deed executed, without
statutory sale proceedings, by an Administrator with the Will Annexed,
pursuant to the power conferred upon the original executor named in a
will which is not a foreign will?
Answer: Yes.
Promulgated May 20, 1949
Standard No. 58-Deed by Administrator with Will Annexed under
power contained in a foreign will.
Problem: Is a title marketable when based on a deed executed by an
Administrator with the Will Annexed appointed by a Colorado Court,
where there were no statutory sale proceedings and where the deed was
executed pursuant to the power conferred upon the original executor named
in a foreign will, if such deed or letters of appointment of the Adminis-
trator with the Will Annexed were recorded prior to the recording of a
conveyance, encumbrance or contract executed by a personal representative
or trustee appointed by a foreign court, as provided by subdivision D of
Sec. 62, Ch. 176, 1935 C.S.A. as amended by Sec. 4, Ch. 341, pages
937-938 of 1947 Session Laws and as again amended in 1949, and Sec. 156,
Ch. 176, 1935 C.S.A. as amended by Sec. 11, Ch. 341, page 943 of 1947
Session Laws.
Answer: Yes.
Promulgated May 20, 1949.
Standard Number 59-Corporation, recital as to existence.
Problem: An instrument affecting title to real estate has been of
record for over 20 years in the office of the Clerk and Recorder of the
county where such real estate is situated and contains a recital to the effect
that the X company is a corporation. Title is derived through the X
company, but no certificate of incorporation or appointment of agent has
been filed for the X Company in said county. May title be passed?
Answer: Yes. Promulgated May 20, 1949.
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Standard No. 60-Variances with respect to sex.
Problem: An instrument contains one or more personal pronouns in-
dicating that a person named therein is of a certain, sex; a subsequent
instrument contains one or more personal pronouns indicating that such
person is of the opposite sex; both instruments have been of record more
than eighteen years in the office of the Recorder of the County in which
the real estate affected is situated. Does such variance render the title
unmerchantable?
Answer: No.
Promulgated May 20, 1949.
Standard No. 61-Joint tenancies prior to March 27, 1939.
Problem: Does a conveyance made prior to March 27, 1939, create
a joint tenancy if it is sufficient in form to create a joint tenancy pursuant
to Chapter 40, Section 4, 1935 C.S.A. (Supplement)
Answer: Yes.
Promulgated May 20, 1949.
Denver Elects 1949-50 Officers;
Admits 30 New Members
Stanley H. Johnson, former District and Juvenile court judge, was
elected president of the Denver Bar Association for the new year beginning
July 1, 1949, at the regular luncheon meeting of the association on May 2.
Other new officers named were: Edwin J. Wittelshofer, first vice
president; Pierpont Fuller, Jr., second vice president; Donald M. Lesher
and William Rann Newcomb, trustees (term to expire June 30, 1952);
Winston S. Howard, Jacob L. Sherman, Myles P. Tallmadge and Floyd F.
Walpole, members of Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion (term to expire October, 1951).
Leander I. Shelley, General Counsel of the Port of New York Authority,
addressed the meeting on the subject "Air Law."
The following attorneys were duly admitted to membership: Ralph
W. Ball Arthur D. Evans, Omer L. Griffin, Robert T. Haines, Percival
B. Hamilton, James Q. Hammond, G. William Harper, Cecil A. Hartman,
Clifton B. Hiester, John lacoponelli, Earl H. Johnson, Loran A. Johnson,
Richard A. Lauterbach, Hover T. Lentz, Dominic T. Lombardi, John D.
Miller, Allen P. Mitchem, Victor C. Muller, Aldo G. Notarianni, Kelly
O'Neall, Jr., Ray L. Perkins, Jr., William F. Reynard, William H.
Sanders, Jr., Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., Donald W. Scudder, Frank H.
Shafroth, James H. Sogn, Warren R. Torrington, Robert G. Wilson and
Charles A. Willis.
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Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corporation; What Is A
Reviewable Judgment?
RAY L. PERKINS, JR.
of the Denver Bar
(Editor's Note: This article was written by Mr. Perkins while he was a student
at the University of Denver College of Law. From time to time, your Editor expects
to publish other papers written by students in DU's course in "Legal Writing" con-
ducted by Mr. Allen Mitchem.)
An interesting case, decided by the Colorado Supreme Court on
December 6, 19481, raises an important problem in the field of appellate
review. Perhaps a decision as to the reviewability of a judgment, decree or order
is one of the most difficult for a court to hand down-a field in which
almost invariably "hard cases make bad law." A litigant or his attorney
may become down-hearted and justifiably disconsolate after losing a case
on a close point of substantive law. But how much more dissatisfied
must be the litigant or attorney whose case is not heard on the merits at
all because of a seeming pedantic application of the technical law of procedure.
Although the facts in the Hyman case are highly complicated as to the
merits-upon which final decision now remains open-they are relatively
simple as bearing on the procedural question. The Velsicol Corporation
brought suit against Julius Hyman & Co., seeking a sweeping injunction
against defendant's manufacture and sale of insecticides by reason of alleged
misuse of confidential information received by defendant Julius Hyman
at a previous time when he was an officer of plaintiff corporation, and for
an accounting in regard to the use thereof and the sales already made. As
an interesting sidelight, the principal insecticide in question was chlordane,
a revolutionary new product which has been extremely helpful in the fight
against agricultural pests, and of which plaintiff and defendant have been
the only two manufacturers.
The case came on for trial, and, after hearings, the record of which
fills some three to four volumes of typewritten transcript, and in which
all the issues of fact and the general equities among the parties were found
in favor of the plaintiff, the court decreed the broad injunctions sought
by plaintiff in perpetual form. The court further decreed that the matter
be referred to a special master for an accounting. How involved a matter
this will be may be suggested by the fact that defendant's gross sales of the
products in question had amounted by March, 1948, to approximately
$1,400,000. At this juncture defendant sought and obtained a stay of
execution as to the injunction, for a short period, and proceeded to sue
out a writ of error on supersedeas for a review of the propriety of the
'Julius Hyman & Co. et al. v. Velsicol Corporation, No. 16084, 201 P. (2d) Adv.
380. Rehearing denied January 3, 1949.
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issuance of the injunction and of the findings of fact which led to the
decree. Defendant in error, plaintiff below, moved the Supreme Court
to dismiss the writ of error, and in a four to three decision defendant in
error's motion was granted.
The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Hilliard, with the then
Chief Justice, Haslett P. Burke, and Justices Jackson and Stone dissenting
without opinion. The court's reasoning on the point in question begins
with the observation that under our rules a writ of error lies only to a
final judgment. The opinion then cites Dusing v. Nelson, 7 Colo. 184, 2 P.
922 (1883), for the statement: "If the order entered in a cause does not
put an end to the action, but leaves something further to be done before
the rights of the parties are to be determined, it is interlocutory, and not
final." The Dusing case involved the question of whether a judgment for
costs only in an ejectment action is final in the sense that the trial court
may not reopen the case upon later application. Whether the facts or the
holding in this case justify the sweeping nature of the quoted statement
is somewhat questionable.
The remainder of the court's reasoning on the point is taken from
that of a Missouri intermediate court in Godefroy Mfg. Co. v. Lady Lennox
Co., 110 S.W.(2d) 803 (1937). While that case is authority for the
Colorado court's holding, it states the rule rather baldly, with no reasoning
or rationale in support of it.
In summation the Colorado court says: "Since there was no judgment
for money against them, plaintiffs in error had but to observe the injunction
against them, desist from manufacturing and selling the product, and
await final judgment .... We cannot give countenance to the unprecedented
procedural methods sought to be invoked by plaintiffs in error."
Weight of Authority to Contrary
In spite of the court's confessed inability to find support for such "un-
precedented procedural methods", there are cases which support the posi-
tion of plaintiff in error.2  Their reasoning may best be illustrated by
reference to the facts of the Hyman case. Here the primary issues between
the parties were as to defendant's right to continue business, manufacturing
and selling insecticides. In a determination of these issues highly involved
questions of law and fact were presented to the trial court, and were re-
solved by that court in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff's principal prayer for
2See, for example, Smith v. Walker, 57 Mich. 456, 22 N.W. 267 (1885). Cf.
Wilson v. Wilson, 64 Mont. 533, 210 P. 896 (1922); Allison v. Drake, 145 Ill. 537,
32 N.E. 537 (1892); McMurray v. Day, 70 Iowa 671, 28 N.W. 476 (1886); O'Rear v.
O'Rear, 227 Ala. 403, 150 So. 502 (1933); Peterson v. Lightfoot, 47 Cal. App. 646,
191 P. 48 (1920); Lewis v. Hickok, 149 Ohio St. 253, 78 N. E. (2d) 569, (1948);
Altschuler v. Alhschuler, 399 Ill. 559, 78 N.E. (2d) 225, 3 A.L.R. (2d) 333 (1948);
Sacramento Valley Irr. Co. v. Lee, 15 N.M. 567, 113 P. 834 (1910); Ashton v.
Thompson, 28 Minn. 330, 9 N.W. 876 (1881).
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relief was for an injunction which by its terms would put defendant out
of business. This injunction was granted. Plaintiff also sought the ad-
ditional relief of an accounting for profits. Without regard to the question
of whether an accounting before a master is a ministerial or a judicial
matter, it is clear that in this case it was completely ancillary to and
dependent upon the principal relief demanded, and upon the findings of
fact and of law made in the determination of the principal issue. At this
point defendant sought review of the trial court's decision of the main portion
of the case, that portion which represented the basic legal conflict between
the parties.
The relative positions of the parties is well stated by the Supreme
Court of Michigan in a case which should be hoary with precedence ......
Smith v. Walker,3 decided in 1885: "The decree grants to the complainant
the principal relief prayed for in his bill, and gives him the immediate
benefit of the judicial action by an injunction that in effect puts an end
to defendant's business. The only ground suggested for a contrary view
is that hereafter, when the accounting is completed, there must be a further
decree. But it is not unprecedented that there should be two decrees in
the same case which are final, in the sense of finally determining rights;
and when the effect is such that the party obtaining the decree is im-
mediately put in possession of the right adjudged to him, the right to
appeal ought not to be questionable. Any other view would sometimes,
in a case like the present, inflict irreparable injury, with no means in the
law for redress."
In effect, the decree of injunction here is one "settling the equities
between the parties", 4 "the final determination of a substantial right for
which the action was brought" 5. "The question, as affecting the right of
appeal, is not what the form of the order may be but what is the legal
effect ' 6. In the view of these courts the decree in question would be a
final judgment in the sense of being an appealable one.
Supporting Precedent and Rules in Colorado
Is there nothing in the Colorado cases which would indicate a tendency
toward liberality in such matters? It is interesting to note that the
following quotation from an early California case' had such an effect
upon Colorado judges that it is quoted in full in three different Colorado
casesS: "A final judgment is not necessarily the last one in an action. A
' 57 Mich. 456, 22 N.W. 267 (1885).
'ORear v. O'Rear, supra, 150 So. 502, at 505.
McMurray v. Day, supra, 28 N.W. 4'6, at 477.
' Peterson v. Lightfoot, supra, 191 P. 48.
'Sharon v. Sharon, 7 P. 456 (1885).
'Daniels v. Daniels, 9 Colo. 133, at 139 and 140, 10 P. 657 (1886); Standley v.
Hendrie & Bolthoff Mfg. Co., 25 Colo. 376, at 379, 55 P. 723 (1898); Durst v. Haenni,
23 Colo. App. 431, at 438 and 439, 130 P. 77 (1913).
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judgment that is conclusive of any question in a case is final as to that
question. The code provides for an appeal from a final judgment, not
from the final judgment in an action." One might note that Rule 111(a)
uses the words "a final judgment." One Colorado court 9 is sufficiently
moved by the gospel. from California to add: "So that the real test to
apply is, that if the judgment pronounced is in the nature of a final one, and
is such upon the question adjudicated, then it becomes such; or, otherwise
stated, where the judgment pronounced is final of the rights of the parties
on the questions therein involved, and settled, and separable from any
other that may be rendered in the action, it is as to such questions a final
judgment." After all, it was a Colorado court which said10 : "The rule
is well established that where doubt exists as to the right of review, such
doubt should be resolved in favor of a review where substantial rights are
involved." This seems to be the simplest manner for disposing of the problem.
There are other possibilities. Rule 111 (a) (3) provides for a writ
of error to a temporary injunction. It is clear that if the judgment
appealed from is not a final injunction, then it is an interlocutory one. A
question might be asked: Is it possible for an interlocutory order or
decree to contain any injunction other than a temporary one? It would
seem that since an interlocutory order may always be modified or rescinded
pending that which the court would consider a final judgment, the injunction
must be in effect re-promulgated in the final decree, until which time it
is merely a temporary injunction, and as such appealable by writ of error
under Rule 111 (a) (3). Although there is authority which would seem
to indicate that there can be a judgment which is res judicata on the point
determined without being final in the sense of subject to review", the
Colorado court has taken a contrary view12. However, at best this is
simply an alternate route toward the same conclusion, and one which is
probably less desirable from the standpoint of precedent.
Another possibility would be for the appellate court to construe the
decree of injunction as a separate judgment under Rule 54 (b). Such a
possibility was rejected by the Colorado court in regard to a judgment of
dismissal as against one of several defendants in a decision prior to the
Rules, in which Justice Hilliard dissented 13. However, it may be noted
that Rule 54 (b) of the Federal Rules has been completely amended in
9 Standley v. Hendrie & Bolthoff Mfg. Co., supra.
1 Ellis v. Gibbons, 26 Colo. App. 454, at 460, 145 P. 285 (1914). This case was
subsequently reversed upon a different point. Gibbons v. Ellis, 63 Colo. 76, 165 P. 783
(1917).
"Bannon v. Bannon, 270 N.Y: 484, 1 N.E. (2d) 975, 105 ALR 1401 (1936).
"Rockwell v. District Court, 17 Colo. 118, at 129, 29 P. 454 (1891):"The doc-
trine of res judicata is applicable only to -those judgments, decrees, orders or rulings of
record which are so far material and final that a review thereof may be had through the
ordinary procedure provided, such as appeals or wrlts of error."
" Boxwell v. Greeley Union National Bank, 89 Colo. 574, 5 P. (2d) 868 (1931).
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the direction of a more conservative approach to the problem of the piece-
meal appeal.
A factor which might be borne in mind is that, in general, foreign
decisions carry less weight in procedural matters than in fields of substantive
common law14. Procedural law by its very nature is local law, law fashioned
to meet the needs of the particular jurisdiction, and dependent upon codified
presentation, either by legislative enactment or by rules of court. A state
court should feel less constrained by the weight of foreign precedent in mat-
ters of its own practice and procedure, and more free to decide such ques-
tions on a rational and open-minded basis. With this suggestion in mind,
it would be desirable to discuss the practical effect of the decision in the
Hyman case.
Accounting is Subsidiary Matter
An accounting, when sought as additional relief rather than as an end
in itself, is in its very nature a subsidiary remedy. It may arise in a partition
suit. A sues B contending that Blackacre, which has been occupied solely by
B, is actually held by them in common. A demands a decree of sale, with
division of the proceeds, and, in addition, that B be required to account for
the rents and profits of Blackacre during his occupancy. The court finds in
A's favor, decrees a partition and sale, and turns the matter over to a master
for an accounting. If B may not have an appeal pending the accounting, of
what value is his appeal? If the trial court should be reversed, Blackacre has
been sold, and B's chances of getting it back are at least doubtful and will
involve action against the purchaser. The substantive rights, the crucial
rights, of the parties were settled at the time of the partition decree.' 5 If
the trial court were in error in its decision, no accounting would ever be
necessary. From the standpoint of prompt justice and of economy B should
have his appeal at that stage in the proceedings.
Similarly in the case of the injunction in an action such as the present.
A sues B for an injunction and an accounting. A gets the injunction, at which
point B goes out of business pending the outcome of the accounting. While
it may not be a fact subject to judicial notice, it is nevertheless obvious to
anyone familiar with the practical side of the law that A is in a position to
be able to delay and prolong the accounting almost indefinitely through
various procedural and practical techniques, knowing that the longer he can
delay, the more chance he has of eliminating B permanently from the picture,
and perhaps of avoiding the defense of an appeal.'0
" "Appeals are creatures of statute, and hence decisions regarding the appellate
practice of other states are not generally regarded as of value as precedents." 14 Am.
Jur., Courts, Section 86, page 300.
" Peterson v. Lightfoot, Allison v. Drake, and Wilson v. Wilson, supra, note 2.
" Sacramento Valley Irr. Co. v. Lee, supra, note 2.
In Boxwell v. Greeley Union National Bank, supra, Mr. Justice Hilliard
dissented in these words:
"Which brings me to the principle which I conceive should be our guide,
namely, that lawyers be advised within the limits of the law; and that in
considering those limits the practical things that confront attorneys should
receive our consideration at least as readily as refined points of procedure."
To this quotation perhaps only one thought might be added . . . that
in considering the practical things confronting attorneys the court should
also bear in mind those for whom our courts of justice exist, the litigants.
Judicial temperament is reputed to be slow to welcome innovation, and in
the history of our jurisprudence we have seen equity and administrative
agencies arise to fill a need which has not been met by the common law
courts. A greater awareness on the part of both the judiciary and the pro-
fession that their reason for being is the public need will go far toward pre-
serving public confidence in the courts and the bar.'
7
Letter to the Editor
In the May, 1949, Dicta, on page 125, there appears this statement:
"Negro lawyers are not accepted for membership in the American Bar
Association". This statement is susceptible to two interpretations. One
is that no Negroes are accepted for membership in the American Bar
Association, and the other is that some Negroes are not accepted for mem-
bership in the American Bar Association. The context would seem to
indicate that the author intended the first interpretation that no Negro
lawyers are accepted for membership in the American Bar Association. If
this was intended, it is incorrect, because the American Bar Association
does have Negro members.
This matter was very vigorously debated in the 1943 meeting of the
American Bar Association, as will be seen from the American Bar As-
sociation Journal of October, 1943. The following resolution was adopted:
"Resolved, that it is the consensus of this meeting
that membership in the American Bar Association is not
dependent upon race, creed or color."
It is my understanding that the American Bar Association had Negro
members at the time this resolution was adopted and has since admitted
other Negroes to membership.
HUBERT D. HENRY
" The reader's attention should be called to an extensive annotation on the general
subject here discussed, to be found in 3 A.L.R. (2d) 342. It is regretted that the anno-
tation appeared too late to be considered in the preparation of this article.
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A Report From The Judiciary Committee
By PHILIP S. VAN CISE
Chairman
This committee started its work in the fall of 1946. It was composed
of 157 members, with at least one member for each county. It raised
$1 5,000.00 for its work and has a balance of only $600.00 on hand.
Its plans were approved by the Colorado Bar Association at the October,
1947 Convention, and thereafter by committees from the District and County
Judges associations, and a bar committee of four (one from each congressional
district) selected by the Board of Governors. At a meeting of the Governors
while the Legislature was in session, the committee was authorized to make
any changes it deemed necessary in order to secure the passage of its
measures.
The following measures were introduced:
Constitutional Amendment House Resolution
No. 1, Senate No. 2
Chief Justice ........................................ H.B. 152 - S.B. 305
Judicial Council .................................... H.B. 153 - S.B. 307
Retirement ---------------------------------------- H.B. 154 S.B. 308
Salaries, Judges ...................................... H.B. 174 - S.B. 306
Salaries, Employees --------------------------- H.B. 482 S.B. 297
Only two bills were passed, H.B. 154, providing for retirement for dis-
trict judges and county judges in counties of over 20,000 population, and H.B.
174, increasing salaries for court employees except in Denver. Both were
modifications of the bills as introduced.
The Constitutional Amendment
The principal measure, of course, was the constitutional amendment,
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 2. This contained all of our proposals for
amendment of the judiciary section of the Colorado Constitution, Article VI.,
with the ABA-Missouri plan of election and appointment, abolition of justice
courts, etc.
Although the constitutional amendment was introduced in both houses,
the united effort was made in the Senate. Bar committee members Stanley
Johnson, Carle Whitehead, Winston Howard, Peter Holme, Jr., Elmer Brock,
Jr., Worth Allen, Sam January, Richard Downing, Louis Hellerstein, and
President William H. Robinson, Jr., all rendered yeoman service in attend-
ing the legislature and working with individual members to secure passage of
our measures. Former State Senator Claude W. Blake was very valuable
in his advice and efforts. Dean Ed King made two trips from Boulder to
help at the legislature.
After many attempts to secure joint hearings by Senate and House com-
mittees we finally had a poorly attended Constitutional Amendment Com-
mittee meeting in the Senate chamber, and then the resolution came to a
vote on third reading.
The heat was all on the Missouri plan. Senators Johnson, Carlson, Laws
and Theobald spoke for it and the others who supported it were Senators
Briscoe, Cheever, Chrysler, Gill, Gobble, Harpel, MacDonald, Murphy, Nor-
cross, Rogers, Ryan, Saunders, Thornton, Veltrie and Whitaker.
On a roll call, the favorable vote would have only been 19 out of the
required 24. Then Senator Dunklee told the writer that if it was sent back
to the committee and the Missouri plan omitted, it could be passed. This
was done, and it passed unanimously as Senate Resolution No. 9.
What The Revised Amendment Provided
The resolution as rewritten had the following most desirable provisions
for amendment of Article VI which we believe the people would have
supported at the 1950 general election:
1. Eleven sections were amended, three sections repealed and three new
sections added.
2. Section 2 was amended by simply inserting a few words that the
Supreme Court, "acting through its Chief Justice" shall have a general su-
perintending control over inferior courts. This was to make the Chief
Justice the responsible head of all courts.
3. Section 5 was amended by the addition of the following paragraph:
."In case of the temporary absence of any judge, or his inability to
serve, the chief justice may recall any retired supreme court judge,
or call any district judge, retired or active, temporarily to serve in
such office, and such judge, while so serving, shall have all the
powers and receive the compensation of a judge of the court to which
he is assigned, but such judge shall not receive any other compensa-
tion, retirement or pension payment from the State while so serving."
This was to enable the supreme, district and county courts always to
have the full bench available for duty, so that public, litigants and lawyers
might be adequately served.
4. Section 8 was obsolete, as it was passed when the Court of Appeals
was abolished and its judges added to the Supreme Court. The new section
abolished the old seniority provision for Chief Justice, provided for his elec-
tion by the Supreme Court judges on the bases of his administrative ability
for a trial term of one year, and thereafter, if desired, for three years. It
also allowed him to assign a judge of any court temporarily to any other court.
5. Section 10 required a Supreme Court judge to be admitted to practice
in Colorado instead of being "learned in the law."
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6. Section 12 was rewritten to read "The State shall be divided into
such judicial districts as may be provided by law, in each of which districts
there shall be one or more judges."
7. Section 16 was modernized and district judges were also required
to be admitted to practice in Colorado.
8. Section 18 allowed judges' salaries to be increased during their term
of oJfice, prohibited judges from practicing law (except in counties under
10,000), or from becoming a candidate for any office except a judicial one,
or from accepting employment or activities of any kind which interfered with
judicial duties. (This therefore prohibited board memberships, which took
judges off the bench.) District judges could hold court for other district or
county judges, and county judges for other county judges, and lawyer county
judges could sit for a district judge when requested by him so to do.
9. Section 22 (County Court) provided for a county judge in each
county, and that there could be additional judges in all counties over 100,000
population. The county judge was to be 25, and required to be a lawyer in
-counties over 10,000 population, unless the Chief Justice determined that
lawyers were unavailable. This section did not apply to county judges in
office. The General Assembly was empowered to abolish the county court
and combine, it with the district court in any county or to consolidate county
courts of several counties.
10. Section 23. Most of this section was retained, but it was amended
by giving county judges "as may be provided by law, other civil and criminal
jurisdiction, to be administered by the judge. or by assistants or subordinates,
at any place within the county." It specifically gave them jurisdiction over the
estates of minors and mental incompetents. It provided for doing away with
trials de nova by stating: "Appeals may be taken, and proceedings of any
kind transferred from the county to the district court, in such cases and in
such manner as may be prescribed by law or by rule of the Supreme Court."
11. Section 25 on justice courts was amended entirely to read:
"(a) The offices of justice of the peace and of constable are abol-
ished effective six months from the adoption hereof. Until June 1, 1955,
or such time thereafter as may be provided by- law, the -jurisdiction
heretofore conferred upon justices of the peace shall be in the county
courts of the counties within which the justice precincts were con-
tained and shall be administered by the judges thereof, and by any
magistrates and referees, appointed by them. Service of process in
civil and criminal actions may be made in the manner provided for
courts of record. Special constables may be appointed by the county
judge. Upon the abolition of justice courts, all cases pending in such
courts shall be transferred forthwith to the county court.
"(b) Magistrates and Referees. To assist in administering the
jurisdiction conferred in Subsection (a) hereof, the county judge in
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each county exceeding 20,000 population may appoint a magistrate;
and, for each additional 30,000 population in excess of 50,000 may
appoint an additional magistrate; and in any county, regardless of
population, with the approval of the chief justice, may appoint ad-
ditional magistrates. To administer non-contested matters within such
jurisdictions the county judge may also appoint referees. All magistrates
and referees shall be residents of the county. The county judge shall
fix the salary of each magistrate in an amount not exceeding seventy-
five per cent of his own salary. He may fix the compensation of
referees with the approval of the county commissioners. Magistrates
and referees shall serve at the pleasure of the county judge.
"(c) Procedure Before Magistrates and Referees. The Supreme
Court shall prescribe rules of civil and criminal procedure covering
the administration of the jurisdiction conferred in subparagraph (a)
hereof. Until otherwise provided by law or rule of court, the pro-
cedure, fees and costs shall be as now prescribed for justice of the
peace courts and constables.
"(d) Magistrates Act in City and Town Courts. Magistrates
of the county courts may also act as police magistrates and municipal
judges, in which case part of their salaries may be paid by the county
and part by the town or city."
12. As all of section 29 had been changed in other sections, vacancies
in district attorneys was all that remained of the section so it was amended
simply to read that such vacancies should be filled by the judges of the dis-
trict the same as now.
13. Sections 7, 13 and 15 were repealed, as all were covered in the
other sections.
The three new sections were as follows:
"Section 31. Election and Terms of Office of Judges of Courts
of Record. All Judges of Courts of Record shall be elected at the
general election unless otherwise provided by law. District judges
shall be elected in their districts and county judges in their county or
counties. The term of office of all judges hereafter elected shall be
as follows: Ten years for judges of the Supreme Court, six years
for district court judges, and four years for county and juvenile
court judges.
"Section 32. Vacancies in Judicial Office. Whenever a vacancy
shall occur in the office of judge of the Supreme Court, the district
court, the county court or the juvenile court, the Governor shall fill
such vacancy. Such appointees shall serve until the second Tuesday
of the succeeding January after the next general election and if
elected shall then serve for a full term of office of such court as pro,
vided in Section 31.
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"Section 33. Retirement. A judge of any court now exist-
ing, or hereafter created, shall be retired from office at such age as
shall be fixed by the General Assembly, but until so fixed upon
reaching 75 years of age, or prior thereto, if found disabled by reason
of mental or physical infirmities from performing the duties of his of-
fice. Issues concerning retirement for age or disability shall be de-
termined by such court, council, board, committee or referee and in
such manner as shall be provided by rule of the Supreme Court, or by
law, with the right of appeal, by the judge affected, to the Supreme
Court."
House Action on The Amendment
As the resolution passed the Senate unanimously, no opposition was ex-
pected in the House. Great difficulty, however, was encountered in getting
it out of the rules committee, and when it emerged on April 15 most of its
supporters were absent. There were very few members present, not even a
quorum, as it was Good Friday afternoon. Amendments were made, with-
out consultation with any of those who had introduced it, to strike out re-
tirement age at 75, and changing the 10,000 persons per county to $15,000!
Then about 2 P.M. only 9 voted for it and it was apparently hopelessly lost.
Radetsky and Hamburg managed to have it brought out for reconsideration
the next day, Saturday, and it lost again 25 to 28, with many of our active
supporters absent. Some details on the vote are as follows, lawyers italicized:
For: Barker, Berry, Bennett, Bentley, Bezoff, Bledsoe, Clay, Cobb,
Crowley, Hamburg, Hill, Houtchens, Johnson, Lamb, Mac Donald, Ogilvie,
Paddock, Pellet, Roth, Stalker, Steele, Tinsley, Wade, Yersin, Mr. Speaker.
Against: Two lawyers, Blackman and Eaton and 26 others.
Absent: Abe, Abernathy, Archambault, Hobbs, O'Neil, Phillips, Pile,
Quiat, Radetsky, Weissenfluh. 10
The Fate of The Statutes
While all statutes were introduced in both houses, we sought to have
them first passed by the House. The retirement bill as prepared by the
district judges went through the House without dissent. One of the Supreme
Court judges objected to their inclusion in the bill and that was at once
amended in the Senate. Then Senator McNichols found many defects in it
from a retirement fund and administrative angle, so had it held in committee.
He conferred with Allen Moore of the Legislative Reference Bureau, who
amended it in these respects and it was speedily passed. As only a few days
of the session remained, there was no time to confer with the District Judges
Association, so it was take it or leave it. The district judges at their meeting
June 4 found it still defective so repudiated it in toto.
The bill for increased salaries also passed the House as written, but the
Senate eliminated salary increases for Denver.
Our bills for judicial council and increased powers for the Chief Justice,
after being approved early in the session by the judiciary committee, were
buried in the rules committee and never saw daylight. We could not get
them out. The bar association favored a judicial council of laymen, lawyers
and judges to constantly study and try to improve the judicial system of
Colorado. This we believe to be the proper approach to the problem-that
laymen and active lawyers, as well as the judges, themselves, work together
for service to the public by the courts.
Some of the members of the Supreme Court had other ideas. Apparently
they were primarily interested in a raise in salary, so they prepared and had
introduced H.B. No. 782. This was sponsored by four lawyer members of
the House. It divided the state into seven departments, each to be presided
over by a Supreme Court judge, who was to coordinate and expedite the
work of the district and county judges in his department. For this additional
work the judges were to receive additional salaries, so that all Supreme
Court judges would get raises to $9,000.00 each, instead of the $6,500.00 the
older judges are getting, and the $7,500.00 being received, by the two justices
elected in November, 1948. As this bill clashed head on with our judicial
council and chief justice bills these justices are credited with keeping our two
measures in the rules committee. H.B. 782 passed the House unanimously but
as it called for- an appropriation of $31,000.00 for the additional salaries the
Senate finance committee buried it.
Then on the very last day for consideration of such a measure, one of
the justices had a proposed constitutional amendment introduced in the House.
This was limited to raises of judges salaries during their tenure of office. This
also unanimously passed the House, but was not even voted on in the
Senate.
Conclusion
Lack of team-work between the bar association judiciary committee and
Supreme Court is to be regretted. The raise of salaries for the Supreme
Court justices was in our constitutional amendment. Many of us believed
that the suggested additional work for extra salaries for Supreme Court
judges as proposed in H.B. 782 was clearly unconstitutional. We also be-
lieved that the Supreme Court judges had enough work to do clearing their
docket, without having quasi-judicial duties added.
In any event we fell down because we didn't properly sell our program
to the individual legislators. If the lawyers throughout the state will first be
committed to a bar association program, then sell the legislature before it
convenes, success will be easy. Otherwise we must have enough funds for a
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full time lobbyist. Many of the district judges, (all but one of the Denver
group) cooperated very actively by writing letters to and contacting legisla-
tors, but we need real teamwork among lawyers, judges and laymen.
Our unfulfilled program is very worthwhile. What do the lawyers and the
bar association want us to do? We believe we should go forward and finish
our job, but need your suggestions, your support and your very active per-
sonal cooperation.
Regents Reject Joint Publication Project
The proposal to have the Rocky Mountain Law Review jointly pub-
lished by the Colorado and Denver law schools and the Colorado and
Denver bar associations, and distributed as Dicta is now to all members of
the associations, was rejected by the Board of Regents of the University
of Colorado at a meeting the latter part of April.
Although the project had the endorsement of the law school at Boulder,
as well as of the other interested organizations, the Regents voted for the
publication of RMLR to remain exclusively in the hands of the University
of Colorado.
This decision means that Dicta will continue to be published either in
its present form or with the participation of the other law schools in the
state. With this thought in mind, the Editor would like to get a better
idea as to just what sort of material the attorneys in Denver and throughout
the state would like to see published in Dicta. Accordingly, the reader is
humbly petitioned to inform the Editor, either by letter or on the form
below, as to his thoughts on the subject, numbering his preferences 1, 2,
3, etc.:
................ current decisions in constitutional law, Federal and state, (now a
regular department edited by Edward H. Sherman of the Denver
bar.)
................ significant decisions at nisi prius in Colorado.
................ comment on Colorado law, cases and practices.
----------_  comment on Federal law, cases and practices.
................ biographical write-ups on outstanding Colorado lawyers.
---------------- humorous anecdotes and stories.
---------------- other (describe what you want and how you think the Editor
can get it with as much particularity as possible.)
Please mail your letters to the Editor, 319 Chamber of Commerce
Bldg., Denver, and accept his thanks in advance for your interest.
Donald B. Robertson of the Denver bar was recently appointed general
attorney of the Denver Tramway Co. Mr. Robertson is a member of the
firm of Johnson and Robertson, which also recently announced the association
with them of James D. Voorhees.
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Denver Bar Outing June 29th at
Park Hill Country Club
The annual outing of the Denver Bar Association will be held on
Wednesday afternoon and evening, June 29th at the Park Hill Country
Club, Entertainment Committee Chairman Wilbur Rocchio announced
recently.
Notices have already gone out to all members requesting information
as to the type of activity in which they wish to indulge. As in previous
years, prizes will be awarded for the leading golf foresomes, bridge teams,
tennis players, horseshoe pitchers, and chess players. The sports, indoor
and otherwise, will be climaxed by a banquet at 6:30, following which
entertainment will be provided by Rocchio's Rickety Rockets. Any mem-
bers who deem themselves talented in some entertainment line and are
willing that this fact become known to other members of the bar, should
get in touch with Mr. Rocchio without delay.
Tickets for this annual gala affair are available at $3.00 either from
the office of the secretary, 319 Chamber of Commerce Bldg. (AL 1355) or
from the following building and area ticket chairmen:
74 Broadway .............................................................................. G . W m . H arper
City and County Bldg ....................... Alvin Weinberger, City Atty's. Office
Colorado Natl. Bank Bldg .............. Merrill Knight, Room 322
Continental Oil Bldg ........................................... Wm. H. Sanders, Room 1038
Equitable Bldg ................................................. Wm. A. Sackman, Room 450
E&C Bldg ....................................................................... Ben Slosky, Room 515
Denver Univ. Law School -------------------------------------------------------- Allen Mitchem
District Attorney's Office ------------------------------------------------------ Richard Schmidt
First National Bank Bldg .......................... James Q. Hammond, Room 403
Gas & Electric Bldg ........................................... E. A. Stansfield, Room 1044
International Trust Bldg ........................ Theodore D. Brown, Trust Dept.
C. A. Johnson Bldg ................................................. Harold Lutz, Room 218
Kittredge Bldg ................................................... Ray L. Perkins, Room 709
Lawyers' Bldg ................................................................................. Paul Buchanan
Majestic Bldg ....................................................... Robert S. Davies, Room 838
Midland Savings Bldg ....... ----.................................. John P. Beck, Room 1007
Railway Exchange Bldg --------------------------------- C. Edward Hoelzer, Room 327
Security Bldg ............................................... Elmer P. Cogburn, Room 519
Security Life Bldg ................................. Sydney H. Grossman, Room 715
State Capitol Bldg ......................................... Robt. Bugdanowitz, AG's office
Symes Bldg ........................................................... Omer L. Griffin, Room 614
Telephone Bldg ........................................................................... John D . M iller
Tramway Bldg .......................... ---..................... James D. Voorhees, Room 506
1513 Tremont P1 ................................................................... Wm. F. Reynard
University Bldg ..................... Leslie A. Gifford, Room 811
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Adjudicating Underground Water Rights Under
The Colorado Doctrine
By A. WATSON McHENDRIE
of the Pueblo Bar
There seems to be some confusion, or difference of opinion, among the
attorneys of the State as to the extent or effect of the decision of Judge
Littler in a proceeding lately pending in the District Court of Mesa County,
Colorado, with relation to the adjudication of underground water rights.' It
is apparently assumed by some that this decision constitutes a departure from,
or a different application of, the established principles and rule of law here-
tofore adopted by our appellate courts upon this subject.
As I read the opinion, findings, conclusions and decree, this judgment
presents no new or novel interpretation of our laws, but merely follows and
reiterates the controlling principles heretofore promulgated by our Supreme
Court in a number of decisions. I have not had the opportunity of reading
the record in this proceeding, and my opinion is based entirely upon the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law as they appear from the rulings and
decree of the trial court.
This proceeding was initiated by the filing of a petition in the District
Court of Mesa County, the court of primary and exclusive jurisdiction for the
adjudication of priorities of right to the use of water in Water District No.
42 of the State of Colorado. It appears from the allegations of the petition
that the petitioner seeks to have adjudicated a priority of right to the use
of water for domestic purposes by pumping the same from a well sunk into
the source of supply which is alleged to be "an artesian basin or strata of
artesian water underlying a part of said county, which is not tributary to any
natural stream."
Several motions to dismiss the petition were filed by other water users in
the Water District, chiefly challenging the jurisdiction of the court to hear,
adjudicate and determine priorities of right to the use of so-called artesian
waters in a statutory proceeding for the adjudication of priorities of right to
the use of water for beneficial purposes. These motions were overruled by
the trial court and his reasons therefore were set forth in quite an elaborate
and well-reasoned written opinion. Further proceedings were had in which
testimony was heard and on August 23, 1948, the court entered a final de-
cree awarding and decreeing to the petitioner, and the other owners of wells
diverting their supply of water from the same or a similar source in the same
area, priorities in order of their respective appropriations for the amounts
shown to have been respectively beneficially used. Apparently, no appeal
was taken from that decision.
'In the Matter of the Application of J. Lewis Ford for an Adjudication in Water
District No. 42, reported in 26 Dicta 92 (April, 1949).
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The material and controlling findings of fact entered by the court may be
stated substantially as follows:
1. The source of supply for the appropriations involved is underground
water found in three separate and distinct sands, known as the Morrison
sand, the Entrada sand and the Wingate sand; that these sands lie above an
impervious strata in the order above named; these water-saturated sands have
no connection with each other and are separated by an impervious structure,
so that no water seeps or percolates from one to the other.
2. That the waters so found in each of these sands constitute a separate
and distinct source of supply in said Water District No. 42, which the
court, for lack of a better term, designates as Zones Nos. 1, 2 and 3.
3. That no part of these waters are tributary to or constitute a part of the
waters of any natural stream.
The material conclusions of law arrived at by the trial court based upon
the foregoing findings of fact are, in substance:
That the doctrine of priority of right to the use of water for beneficial
uses applies to underground water the same as to surface waters flowing in
a natural stream.
That the trial court, therefore, has jurisdiction of the subject matter to
adjudicate and determine these rights in the same manner and upon the
same basis as in the adjudication of surface flows.
Assuming that the findings of fact above referred to are supported by
the evidence, I am of the opinion that the conclusions of law based thereon
as above set forth are clearly stated and accurately applied.
There seems to be difference of opinion among irrigation lawyers and en-
gineers as to whether or not the waters denominated herein as "artesian,"
strictly and technically fall within the class of underground water known
to the geologists as "artesian." In my opinion this is of no importance or con-
sequence. Whether or not the source of supply, may be artesian, underground
streams, underground ponds, percolating waters or diffused underground
waters the same legal rules and principles should apply to the appropriation
and. utilization thereof for beneficial purposes in exactly the same manner
and with exactly the same effect .
In the instant case, in my judgment, the problem resolves itself into a
single question of fact, i. e. whether these waters are from a closed basin
which prevents them from becoming tributary to, or a part of, the waters
of a natural flowing stream either upon or underneath the surface. The trial
court found that the water involved herein was not tributary to any natural
stream. Hence, the application of the proper rule of law is stare decisis in
Colorado. This class of water has come to be known as "developed" water,
when appropriated. The settled law of the state upon that subject is that
when waters are not and cannot become a part of a stream, either by surface
or subterranean flow, an appropriator who first develops this water and puts
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it to a beneficial use is entitled to a priority of right to the use thereof as
against the world. And further, that the same rules of law apply to the
appropriation of underground waters which do not and cannot reach the
stream and become a part thereof as are applied to the appropriation and ad-
judication of rights in the waters of surface streams.
Among the numerous decisions of our Supreme Court in which the fore-
going rule was announced and applied, may be cited: Ripley vs. The Park
Center Land & Water Co., 40 Colo. 129; San Luis Valley Irr. District vs.
Rio Grande D. District, 84 Colo. 99; Leadville Mine Dev. Co., vs. Anderson,
91 Colo. 536; Dalpez vs. Nix, 96 Colo. 540; De Haas vs. Bennish, 116 Colo.
344.
In conclusion, it seems clear to me that the trial court in this proceeding
has logically reasoned and accurately adopted and applied the existing rules
of law to the specific problem with which it had to deal.
John G. Johnson, Lawyer
By HENRY MCALLISTER
of the Denver Bar
I read in the March, 1948, Dicta a very interesting address on "Judah
P. Benjamin, Lawyer and Statesman" by Hon. John W. Delehant, Judge
of the United States District Court for Nebraska.
After reading it, I concluded that when time permitted I would submit
to Dicta some remarks concerning a man who, in my opinion, was the
greatest lawyer ever produced in America, measured by the magnitude of
his labors in and out of the courts. That I undertake now.1
This man's career ended only by his death in 1917, about 30 years ago,
and as indicative of the fleeting reputation of a great lawyer, I doubt
whether prior to that time 10% of his contemporary Colorado attorneys ever
heard of him. I reduce that percentage now to 5% of the present members
of the bar.
His name was John G. Johnson, born in 1841, at Chestnut Hill, a suburb
of Philadelphia, the son of a blacksmith and a milliner in straightened cir-
cumstances. He died at the age of 76, still active in his profession in Phila-
delphia. He graduated from a Philadelphia high school, studied law in a law
office and before he was thirty years old, was one of .the outstanding lawyers
at the Philadelphia bar, proverbial for its eminence. From that time on,
by extraordinary genius and labor, he advanced rapidly in his profession
and when he died, was acknowledged by all who knew, or knew of, him
as the unquestioned leader of the entire American bar. Upon his death
many columns of Eastern newspapers, especially in Philadelphia and New
'For many statements in this article I am indebted to the biography of "John G.
Johnson", by Barnie F. Winkelman of the Philadelphia bar. (Univ. of Pa. Press, 1942.)
York, including their editorial columns, were filled with eulogies of this
marvelous man.
The limits of this article do not permit reference to all tributes re,
specting him. I mention only two. Chief Baron Palles, a renowned Irish
jurist, on a trip to America, stated that he most wanted to meet the man
who was the greatest lawyer in the English-speaking world. Mr. George
Wharton Pepper, now probably the leader of the Philadelphia bar, in his
work "Philadelphia Lawyer," states that John G. Johnson was the most
stupendous man he had ever known. It is estimated that during his career
at the bar, he appeared in from 1,500 to 2,000 cases, large and small, be-
fore the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, covering the whole gamut of
jurisprudence, though perhaps those involving estates, wills and trusts were
the more numerous. Prior to the establishment in 1886 of the Atlantic Re-
porter (containing Pennsylvania decisions), he was repeatedly before that
court. I venture to say that no volume of that Reporter (about 100 in num-
ber to the date of his death) failed to contain not only one but many of his
cases. Recently, I selected at random one volume and found that he had
been in 15 cases before that court. Many he won, others he lost, in some
instances probably because he was called in after trial, and assumed a lost
cause.
More Than A Corporation Lawyer
Many called him by a title which is anathema to me, "a corporation
lawyer." As presently indicated he represented great corporations, but at the
same time no case was too small for his advice and assistance. It is reported
that the late and original J. P. Morgan arranged for special trains to take
him from Philadelphia to New York for consultations. Finally this be-
tame monotonous to Johnson and he stated, in substance, that "if those New
York fellows want to see me they can come to Philadelphia," and if they
came, as they did, and Johnson was at the moment in conference with some
poor washerwoman on her troubles, they would have to cool their heels in
the anteroom until he got through.
Johnson appeared as counsel in many great cases in the federal courts
and especially the Supreme Court of the United States, but his prominence
there was emphasized in controversies arising out of the Sherman Anti-trust
Act of 1890. One of the first cases reaching the Supreme Court was the
Knight case raising the question as to whether a monopoly in sugar refining
at Philadelphia constituted a violation of that act. While Johnson nominally
represented the Knight Company, in fact he represented American Sugar
Refining Company. In brief, the court held that the mere manufacture of
sugar did not constitute interstate commerce (156 U. S. 1).
Johnson's victory in that case brought him into instant prominence in
the later great anti-trust cases before the Supreme Court, and in all of which
he was counsel. The first of these was the Northern Securities case involving
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the practical merger of the Northern Pacific with the Great Northern (193
U. S. 197). Johnson represented the Northern Securities Company, but he
lost by a 5-4 decision. It has been said (perhaps with exaggeration) that his
argument before the Supreme Court in that case was the greatest ever de-
livered, and also that he received a fee of $500,000.00 for his services. The
loss of that case was somewhat compensated by his success in an after-
math which provided that the shares of stock of the railroad companies ac-
quired by Northern Securities should be distributed to its stockholders pro-
rata and not, as Harriman demanded, to the two interests which had trans-
ferred them to the Securities Company (197 U. S. 244).
Johnson also appeared in the Standard Oil and Tobacco Company anti-
trust cases (221 U. S. 1, 106); and also in behalf of United States Steel
Corporation (223 Fed. 55), though he died before the Supreme Court's
decision in that case (251 U. S. 417).
While the later decisions of the Supreme Court whittled away its first
decision in the Knight case and practically overruled it sub silentio, Johnson
never admitted or recognized that fact and in all of the later decisions above
mentioned he relied upon that case, though without much success.
Laconic "John G."
But these prodigious labors in litigation were but a small part of the
work conducted in his office involving transactions, some small and others of
greatest importance, concerning corporate reorganizations, trust and a multi-
tude of others. His preeminence at the bar was so well-recognized that many
prospective litigants would get together and say let us submit this to "John
G." This was done, and his decision was final. His opinions were often
laconic but convincing. It is reported that on one occasion when he was
vacationing in Europe certain prominent financiers were considering a large
corporate merger and cabled him for his opinion. His reply was "Merger
possible, conviction sure."
Of course, he had a number of able assistants in his Philadelphia office,
but the office was simplicity itself. His door was always open for either
rich or poor.
In marked contrast with this is the story included in an address by
Robert T. Swaine, one of the present leaders of the New York bar, before
the Law Club of Chicago in December last, and repeated in American Bar
Association Journal of February, 1949. Referring to a story which went
the rounds in New York in the '20's, he said:
"**In the new multifloored offices of a large firm the soft
green walls of the reception hall had just the right number of oil
paintings, the lighting was subdued; the rugs were deep-piled; and the
managing partner took great pride in the pulchritude of his feminine
clerical staff. One day, so the story goes, a brusque but successful oil
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prospector from Oklahoma came in. As he was kept waiting, he be-
came restless but also interested in the beautiful young stenographers
passing through the reception hall to an upper floor. Turning on
her most seductive smile, the receptionist asked if she could not get
him a drink, assuring him that if he wanted a highball it was avail'
able. 'Yes,' said the client, 'I guess I will have a drink, but I don't
think I'll go upstairs'."
Foibles and Fables
Johnson was a man of great physical as well as mental stature. He was
not a polished orator or speaker, but his arguments were powerful and were
limited to hammering on the points which he considered controlling.
Like all great mentalities, Johnson had his eccentricities or foibles, some
of which might not appeal to American lawyers. Twice he was offered a
place on the Supreme Court of the United States and twice he declined,
when he was comparatively young at the bar. He never joined the American
Bar Association. Often when he finished his argument in a court he would
pick up his papers and go out without waiting to hear from his adversary.
He shunned publicity. When he received a form from "Who's Who in
America" for his autobiography he would throw it in the waste basket and
the publisher would be required to prepare a home-made biography reading
"Johnson-John G.- corporation lawyer, Land Title Building, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania." His charges for services were the plague of those associated
with him who were required to restrict their charges by those he fixed for
himself. He received large compensations along with small amounts, but
upon some occasions he would return a check for his' services, and the
trembling clients would apologize and state that they would pay whatever
he asked. He would say "send me one-half of that amount, my service did
not justify the amount you have sent me."
His one avocation was the assembling of rare paintings and portraits,
many of which he personally collected on vacations in Europe. These he
placed on every wall and in every nook and corner of his plain house on
Broad Street, Philadelphia, a few blocks from his office. On occasions he
ordered certain of these placed on the ceiling over his bed in order that he
might study them. In his will he left this collection valued at millions of
dollars, to the city of Philadelphia, to be preserved in his house. This be-
came impossible because of the change in the character of the neighborhood
and the insufficiency of the facilities for public inspection. Apparently under
the principle of cy pres they were established as the Johnson Collection in
the Philadelphia Art Museum.
If Johnson could awaken to all that has happened since his death, the
growth of administrative law, the creation of innumerable boards and bureaus,
tax courts, etc., he would lament the past but doubtless apply his great in-
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tellect, restricted though it would be, to thq' far less attractive field than the
one he had left.
Consecrating himself to the law he did not attain prominence in the
public eye as such contemporaries as Joseph H. Choate, Elihu Root or Charles
Evans Hughes, to name but a few, who achieved great reputations in public
service, but in the magnitude of his labors in the pure field of law he sur-
passed them all.
The bar will never see his like again.
San Luis Valley Elects New Officers
Information has been received from retiring-president Richard E. Conour
that the following new officers were elected for the San Luis Valley- Bar
Association on May 9: John I. Green, president; and Gordon H. Rowe, vice-
president. For the 27th consecutive time, Ralph C. Ellithorpe, court reporter
for the 12th Judicial District, was elected secretary-treasurer.
After a long period in the military service, Eugene A. Bond has
resumed his practice in the Bank Annex Building, Leadville.
Henry P. Hays of Pueblo has moved his office from 420 Colorado
Building to 311 Thatcher Bldg.
Hugh B. Kellogg of Denver has moved his offices from 808 E&C Bldg.,
to the new Service Investment Co. Bldg., at 1421 Court Place.
James A. Sweeney has moved his offices from the Patterson Bldg., in
Denver to 1537 Wadsworth Avenue, Lakewood.
Worth Allen, Frank P. Lynch, Jr., and Philip A. Rouse have all
moved their offices from their former suite in the E&C Bldg., to 322
Majestic Bldg.
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Lunch Service
At 1649 Broadway Denver




Zipper on 3 sides. Patented leather




D. B. Cerise is the genial host and
Manager
* Convenient, pleasant and reliable
surroundings.
" Excellent Food-Dining that has sat-
isfied the demanding tastes of all
patrons.
Visit Our New Cocktail Lounqe
Phone MAin 6261









1655 South Franklin St., Denver, Colo.






1641 California St., Denver 2 -..
Phone KEystone 0241 Denver, Colo.
Greetings to the Bar Association
BRAINERD, MONTGOMERY & CO.
Insurance and Real Estate
University Bldg. Phone KE 2233 Denver
PEERLESS PRINTING COMPANY
The Brief and Abstract Printers of Colorado
TAbor 3368 1989 Broadway, Denver
Dicta Advertisers Merit Your Patromge
